and not the statutory rate that most directly affects the competitiveness of US-based multinationals against multinationals based in other OECD jurisdictions.
However, neither side has data to support its claims. Almost all existing studies of the effective tax rate on US-based multinationals focus only on those companies, and do not attempt to compare them with multinationals based in other countries. 6 The only exception is a recent study commissioned by the Business Roundtable and executed by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 7 However, as discussed below, this study suffers from numerous flaws, the most important of which is that it includes 2000 companies from 58 foreign countries and therefore has many companies that are not serious competitors of large USbased multinationals (e.g., companies based in Morocco, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Jordan, Lebanon and Oman).
The competitiveness issue is primarily about the ability of the largest US multinationals to compete with their counterparts based in other countries, and especially those based in the EU (since Japanese multinationals are known to be subject to higher statutory and effective tax rates than US ones, and therefore they are less relevant to this debate). 8 We have therefore decided to study the overall effective tax rates of the largest 100 US-based multinationals over the past decade, and compare them with the effective tax rates of the largest 100 EU-based multinationals. 9 In our opinion, this is the comparison that is most relevant to resolving the competitiveness issue, because (a) it focuses only on large multinationals in the most relevant jurisdictions 10 , (b) it focuses on the overall effective tax rate borne by each group of multinationals, and not on other issues such as the statutory tax rate, the effective tax rate on foreign source income, or whether dividends from active income can be repatriated tax free. Those issues, while important for other purposes (e.g., transfer pricing or the "lock out" effect), are in our view irrelevant to the competitiveness issue.
Methodology
To find the 100 biggest U.S. companies and the 100 biggest European companies, we used the list of Forbes 2000 biggest public companies for 2011, as published in Forbes magazine's website 11 . We then constructed our database by choosing the most highly ranked U.S. and European companies respectively. The list of the 200 chosen companies is presented in Table 1 .
We then searched the COMPUSTAT database (both North America and Global) to find financial data of the chosen companies. For every company in our list of chosen companies, we found the pretax income, net income and current income tax for the fiscal years 2001 -2010.
If, for some reason, a certain company did not have any financial data available on the COMPUSTAT database for all fiscal years mentioned, we did not include it in our database and replaced it by the next highest ranked company on the Forbes 2000 list. We then translated all financial data into U.S. dollars using annual exchange rates taken from OANDA website 12 . At the end of this process, we obtained a database of 200 companies (100 U.S. companies and 100 European companies) with at least one year of financial data between 2001 and 2010. Table 2 describes the distribution of companies by country of residence.
Comparing the effective tax rates in each region (Europe and the U.S.), we calculated aggregate effective tax rate as follows:
where , is the aggregate effective tax rate of region i during period t. The numerator is the sum of all current income taxes paid by the companies residing in region i (indexed j) during period t and the denominator is the sum of all pretax income paid by the companies residing in region i during the same period. Naturally, the COMPUSTAT database may not have the relevant data to calculate this measure for all companies during all fiscal years. For this reason, we only used available data that can be found either directly (i.e. both pretax income and current income tax are available) or indirectly (i.e. either pretax income or current income tax can be found by adding current and deferred income tax to net income or subtracting deferred income tax and net income from pretax income respectively).
The AETR is therefore a measure of effective tax rate paid by the business sector in every region. Our decision to use aggregate measures in our study is a result of (what we see as) a bias that can occur when using some kind of average (either weighted or not) of effective tax rates of individual companies. This bias is more significant when companies have a relatively low (or even negative) pretax income. When this is the case, all deviation from the current (say, 35% in the case of U.S. companies) tax provision may strongly affect the effective tax rate. To illustrate this, consider the following example with two companies, A and B. Both companies' revenues in a given year equal $1,000,000. The pretax profits, however, are different and equal $100,000 and $10,000 respectively. If both pay 35% of pretax income as income tax, then the AETR is 35%. Assume now that there is a tax credit to company A on the amount of $2,000. This adjustment will decrease the effective tax rate of company A by approximately 6% (from 35% to 33%). However, if the same adjustment was made to company B, the effective tax rate would decrease by approximately 57% (from 35% to 15%). This difference would also affect the average effective tax rate if weighted by revenues. If the tax adjustment was made to company A, the new average effective tax rate would be 34%. If, on the other hand, the adjustment was made to company B, the new average effective tax rate would be 25%. A similar example can show biased calculations when the average effective tax rate is weighted by any variables other than pretax profit.
Several ways are used in the literature to avoid this bias. One way (used in the PwC study mentioned above) is to eliminate outliers. It is reasonable to assume that relatively low (or negative) pretax income generates either too high or too low (or negative) effective tax rates. For this reason, in cases where either too high or too low effective tax rate is detected, the observation is eliminated. However, it is our view that outliers in this context are part of the data. Furthermore, when the aggregate effective tax rate is calculated the way we do, relatively low pretax income and relatively low income tax will have relatively low effect on the measure. A tax credit to a company with low or negative pretax income is not an outlier. It should therefore be treated the way it is: part of the total income tax collected by the tax authority during the tested period.
In other cases, it is possible that such elimination will result with keeping the outliers. To illustrate this, consider the above example and assume that the researcher chooses to exclude companies with non-positive effective tax rates. Assume now that company A received a tax credit of $20,000 and company received a tax credit of $3,500. The researcher will exclude company B because of a relatively small tax adjustment, where company B will still be part of the data with a much larger tax adjustment. To sum, excluding outliers does not ensure the isolation of companies with reasonable effective tax rate on one hand, and does not provide accurate results on the other hand.
Another way is to aggregate data across periods. If a certain company showed an abnormal tax rate in a certain year, then aggregating income taxes over several years should dismiss small or insignificant deviations from standard tax rate levels. For this reason, in addition to annual analysis, we also provide results across ten years of study.
Results
AETR values of each region are presented in Table 3 for different fiscal years and for the last decade. The table shows that in eight out of ten years, the European AETR is higher than the U.S. AETR. In addition, the European AETR is also higher for the period 2001 -2010.
As can be seen in table 3, results for the fiscal year 2008 show abnormally high AETRs. We believe that it is somehow connected to the economic downturn that stroke at the beginning of that year. For this reason, and in order to maintain the comparability of the results, we excluded this year from the calculated AETR for the decade and present in the second row from the bottom the AETR for the fiscal years 2001 -2007, 2009 and 2010 . Lastly, in case abnormality persisted to later year, we present in the bottom row aggregated results for the fiscal years 2001 -2007 only. Overall, these adjustments resulted in minor modifications to the initial results presented for the decade (third row from the bottom). We can therefore conclude that according to the analysis, US companies pay, on average, effective tax rate of approximately 30%, and European companies pay, on average, effective tax rate of approximately 34%. Figure 1 describes the distribution of companies from each region by industry. The figure shows that the distribution is relatively similar across regions. We can also learn from the figure that in both regions, about half the companies are defined as manufacturers. Table 4 shows the AETRs of each region for the years 2001 -2011 for each industry segment separately. According to the table, The US AETRs are lower in the manufacturing, transportation, services and public administration segment, while the European AETRs are lower in the mining, trade and finance segments.
Discussion
Our results are the opposite from those found in the PwC study, even though the PwC study used the same methodology (i.e. calculated AETR as aggregate income tax divided by aggregate pretax income). However, in our opinion the PwC study is flawed, and should not be taken as an indication that US based multinationals are subject to a higher AETR than their counterparts from other countries. The reasons for this conclusion are as follows:
1. PwC used all 2000 companies in the Forbes Global database, while we used only the largest 200 (100 U.S. and 100 EU). As explained above, in our opinion focusing on the largest companies is more closely related to competitiveness. 3. PwC compared U.S. companies to those from 58 other countries, not to European companies as a group (although they did compare U.S. to OECD countries). We used the biggest 100 U.S and biggest 100 European companies. In our opinion this method is more relevant to the competitiveness question because the PwC includes many companies from small countries that do not provide serious competition to large US multinationals (e.g., Morocco).
4. PwC eliminated outliers, while we did not. As explained above, outliers can have an important impact on the results and there is no reason to assume they are irrelevant in this context. By eliminating outliers, PwC limited themselves to conventional cases only (i.e. only to those companies with effective tax rate in the 20%-40% range). In our opinion, this analysis is all about the outliers. We are looking for the special cases that make the difference. This is why we only include the top 100 companies from each group. In such a small number, any tax holiday should make the difference, so it is important to include outliers.
5. For income tax, PwC used current income tax and changes in deferred tax, while we used only current income tax. While over a ten year period one might expect that most deferred taxes will become current taxes, in our opinion using deferred taxes can be misleading because they just represent one accounting firm's best guess as to whether taxes will have to be paid. For example, under FIN 48 deferred taxes have to be booked if a transaction that avoids taxation has a 50% chance of being upheld by the courts if challenged by the IRS, but not if it has a 51% chance (in the opinion of the accounting firm). In addition, deferred taxes may or may not include the tax on repatriations, depending on the company's assertion that the earnings are or are not permanently reinvested overseas, which in turn assumes that the tax law relating to repatriations will remain unchanged. In our opinion these determinations are too flimsy a basis to calculate AETRs reliably. Using only current taxes insures that the AETR reflects taxes that have actually been paid or accrued.
6. Table 1 of the PwC study provides a list of 59 countries that were included in the analysis. But from tables A1 to A4 of the appendix to the PwC study, only 13 countries have more than 30 observations in each year. This means that for all the rest, it cannot be assumed (statistically) that the results properly represent the real populations. Among these 13, the U.S. ranked number 7 (right in the middle). In addition, the AETRs of some countries from the 59 are based on one observation, which cannot be representative.
In contrast with the PwC study, our results are consistent with previous studies that have focused on comparing the ETRs of various jurisdictions. 16 A PwC study from 2008 concluded that the US ETR was 27.1% while the weighted average for the OECD excluding the US was 27.7%; for the fifteen largest countries outside the US, the weighted average ETR was 27.2%.
17 As Gravelle concluded, these studies all confirm that "effective tax rates in the United States and in other countries are similar." 18 6.
Conclusion
We believe that this study indicates that US-based multinationals do not face a tax induced competitive disadvantage in competing against EU-based multinationals. Even though the US statutory rate is ten percentage points higher than the average corporate statutory rate in the EU, the effective US corporate tax rate is the same or lower than the effective EU corporate tax rate for the largest US and EU multinationals.
Presumably, the reason for this result is that while the EU countries have a lower statutory rate, their tax base is larger because it has fewer exceptions. In fact, a comparison of the CFC rules of the US (Subpart F) and the major EU jurisdictions (UK, Germany, Italy, France) indicates that the EU CFC rules tend to be tougher than Subpart F because (a) they take into account the effective tax rate in the source country in deciding whether to tax income from a CFC, and (b) they take into account whether the CFC has a real presence in the source country. Under the EU rules, for example, a bank earning interest income in a tax haven is likely to be subject to current tax because the effective tax rate in the haven is low and the bank does not have a real presence in the haven. Under Subpart F the income will likely qualify for the active financing exception. In addition, the EU does not have anything like the US rules that enable US multinationals to shift profits from high tax to low tax CFCs without incurring a US tax cost (check the box and IRC 954(c)(6)).
This conclusion suggests that the US can in fact reduce its corporate tax rate to the EU average in a revenue neutral fashion without affecting the competitiveness of US-based multinationals, since such a move would simply result in a tax regime that is more similar to that faced by EU companies. Specifically, as many observers have recommended, it should be possible to abolish deferral altogether if the US rate were reduced sufficiently. Such a move would have tremendous simplification potential since it would be possible to get rid of both Subpart F and outbound transfer pricing enforcement, and it would eliminate the "lock out" problem as well (since repatriations would not be taxed). Alternatively, it should be possible to amend Subpart F to take the source country rate into account, so that an effective source rate that is below 90% of the US statutory rate would result in a Subpart F inclusion, while reducing the US statutory rate. Such a move, while not as radically simplifying as abolishing deferral, will significantly reduce the pressure on outbound transfer pricing while not resulting in a competitive disadvantage to US-based multinationals or inducing more profit shifting from the US to low taxed offshore locations, like the current rules do. 
